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1 Introduction
2 False Claims Made By MAG, The AMA And The Insurance
Industry
A) “Litigation Explosion”? FALSE.
B) Average Claim Payments In Georgia Are Substantially
Increasing? FALSE.
C) The Number of Claims Paid In Georgia Is Substantially
Increasing? FALSE.
D) Claims Paid Over a Million Dollars Are Skyrocketing?
FALSE.
E) MAG Mutual Is Following A Nationwide Trend Of
Increasing Claim Costs? FALSE.
F) Doctors Are Fleeing From Georgia? FALSE.
3 Insurers And The Medical Community Admit Tort Reform
Doesn’t Reduce Premiums
4 The Reason Insurers And The Medical Community Admit
Tort Reform Doesn’t Reduce Premiums Is Because History And
The Hard Data Prove It
5 Insurers Admit Premiums Will Not Be Reduced In The
Future
6 Aren’t Insurance Companies Having To Pay More
In Claims Than They Are Able To Earn In Premiums And Therefore In
Financial Trouble? NO And NO.
7 MAG Mutual – Nothing But Profits
8 The Insurance Cycle – Déjà Vu
All Over Again
9 The Wall Street Journal – Insurers Provoked
This “Crisis”
10 St. Paul And Other Exiting Insurers – Mismanagement
And Fraud To Blame, Not Juries
11 Evidence In Georgia Shows The Journal Is Right
12 Malpractice Premiums Do Not Drive Up Health Costs
13 Malpractice Defendants Already Have Special Legal
Protections in Georgia
14 Real Legislative Solutions
15 The Real Crisis – Medical Negligence
16 Conclusion
Insurance rates have recently been rising considerably
across the country. The increases are not unique to the medical
malpractice market. Instead, all insurance rates, including premiums
for automobile, homeowner’s, health, and legal and medical
malpractice insurance have been increasing. As shown below, auto
insurance premiums increased 8.4% from 2000 to 2001.[1] Homeowner’s
insurance premiums increased 8% from 2000 to 2001.[2] Also, health
insurance premiums increased 11% during that same time period.[3]
It has been reported that legal malpractice premiums are rising
by 25% or more irrespective of whether a lawyer has had a claim.[4]
The American Medical Association, the Medical Association of Georgia,
the Georgia Hospital Association, MAG Mutual Insurance Company and
other insurance companies, seeking to take advantage of this national
insurance problem, contend that the rising premiums will force hospitals
to limit services or close their doors and will force doctors to
leave their practices in Georgia or stop practicing in “high
risk” areas. They claim that the cause of this “crisis”
is an explosion in litigation in Georgia and the only way to keep
medical malpractice premiums down is to impose severe restrictions
on the legal rights of injured patients and families.
A close and objective evaluation and analysis of Georgia’s
tort system, and most critically, of medical malpractice claims,
confirms there is indisputably not a “tort crisis” in
Georgia. Instead, the hard facts prove the alleged tort crisis that
MAG, MAG Mutual and the others are seeking to create is based on
nothing but innuendo, halftruths and significant distortions of
data that bear no relevance to the state of affairs in Georgia.
Virtually every objective, empirical study refutes any contention
there is a tort crisis in Georgia. In 2000, Professors Thomas Eaton
and Suzette Talarico of the University of Georgia authored the most
exhaustive study ever done on the court system in Georgia. Consistent
with numerous similar studies around the country, they concluded
that there is no tort crisis in Georgia and that “this
growing body of research indicates that the tort system in operation
is much different from the one portrayed in the popular and political
rhetoric of tort reform and there is no evidence of an explosion
in tort filings, and there are few signs of run-a-way juries.”
[5]
Those seeking to make drastic changes to longstanding law in Georgia
bear the burden of proving that cutting off the rights of Georgia
citizens catastrophically injured as a result of medical malpractice
is warranted. They have utterly failed to carry that burden because
the facts directly contradict their claims. Nonetheless, because
the stakes are so high, GTLA submits the information and data contained
within these materials in order to provide verifiable information
to those interested in learning the truth and to absolutely refute
any assertion that a “medical malpractice crisis” exists
in this state.
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The claims being made about a “litigation explosion,”
doctors “fleeing” Georgia and “tort reform’s” effectiveness in controlling
rates or attracting doctors are all false.
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The truth is that patients almost never sue their doctor -- even
when they are harmed by their doctor’s negligence. A comprehensive
study performed by Harvard and cited approvingly by the Bush administration
noted that of all patients harmed by negligence, only 1.53% filed
a claim.[6] This means
that 98.47% of patients harmed by their doctors’ negligence do not
seek to hold the doctor accountable.
Of all the lawsuits filed in Georgia, only about 5-7% of those
cases are personal injury cases.[7]
And, of that 5-7%, only 4-5% of those cases involve medical malpractice
claims.[8] Thus, medical malpractice claims make up somewhere
between .2% and .35% of all the civil lawsuits filed in Georgia.[9] In fact, other than family law disputes, the overwhelming
majority of lawsuits filed in our state involve business litigation
and the overwhelming majority of plaintiffs filing lawsuits are
businesses. That includes some of the same businesses now screaming
for tort reform.
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The report of a one million dollar average award being reported
by the media and used by MAG, GHA and the insurers is simply wrong.
As stated in a recent Wall Street Journal article, this data is
collected unscientifically, tends to include only large verdicts,
and does not include defense verdicts, non-jury trial verdicts,
verdict reductions, settlements or verdicts overturned on appeal.[10] Nonetheless, the JVR publications
relied upon by the insurers to prove a malpractice crisis exists
in Georgia actually confirms the exact opposite:
The truth is that according to JVR’s own publications, the median
medical malpractice verdict in Georgia for the years 1995 to 2001
was significantly less than the countrywide medians for the same
years. It was reported this year Georgia’s median was less than
one half the national average.[11]
Data from the National Practitioner Data Bank reflects the
further truth that the median size of medical malpractice claims
in Georgia (in excess of $25,000) has remained essentially level
over the past four to five years in stark contrast to the 34% increase
in the median paid claims for the rest of the country.[12]
According to data received from MAG Mutual, its average payout
to victims of medical negligence in Georgia as of May 2002 was only
$269,015, down by close to $100,000 per claim since 1999.
And, when adjusted for inflation, b>the average payout
by MAG has gone DOWN by over 5% since 1991![13]
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According to the National Practitioner Data Bank’s closed claims
database, the truth is that: the number of medical malpractice claims
paid in Georgia has gone /u>DOWN since 1999 while the rest of the
country has increased.[14]
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The truth is that MAG paid only 8 one million dollar
plus claims in 1992. That number only increased to 12 one million
dollar plus claims a decade later in 2001, despite a substantial
increase in the number of doctors insured over the past ten years.
Given the fact MAG now insures over seventy percent of doctors
in Georgia, million dollar claims paid per doctor and per claim
have decreased over the past ten years.
MAG’s data also reflects the number of million dollar
claims actually decreased from 1999 to 2001.
Also important is the fact that from 1987 through the present
the total average payout on all one million dollar plus claims has
not greatly exceeded one million dollars.
Those cases undoubtedly involved catastrophic outcomes with economic
damages in the six to seven figure ranges. Where are the runaway
verdicts? Where are the high settlements generated by huge non-economic
exposure? They simply do not exist!
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The bogus claims of a litigation explosion are further disproved
by MAG Mutual’s own physician publication The MAGnet that in 2001
boasted:“… we reduced the average cost of each claim regardless
of a significant nationwide increase in claim severity.”[15]
One must question why the insurance and health care industries
are continuing to use statistics that are widely recognized to be
incorrect or which do not apply to Georgia while they either hide
their own numbers or distort their own data.
The truth is that there simply is no explosion in either the
number or size of claims being paid in Georgia!
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Any assertion that the lack of tort reform measures will cause
doctors to leave Georgia is specious. One recent study found that,
“despite anecdotal reports that favorable state tort environments
with strict … tort and insurance reforms attract and retain physicians,
no evidence suggests that states with strong … reforms have done
so.”16]
Most importantly, the truth is that Georgia does not have a shortage
of doctors. In fact: there were 78% more doctors per capita practicing
in Georgia in 1999 than there were in 1975.[17]
There is strong evidence that Georgia is attracting
more and more doctors as opposed to less. In a recent Forbes article,
it was noted that a physician from Philadelphia had moved to Georgia
in order to reduce his premium costs. The article stated: “Dr.
John Angstadt, 44, started looking to move out of suburban Philadelphia
when his insurance increased from $14,000 in 1994 to $66,000 last
November. In December, he joined a large practice in Savannah,
GA. where he now pays just $16,000 for insurance. Now, instead
of worrying about rising costs and lawsuits, he can practice medicine.”[18]
Any claim that we do not have enough doctors in Georgia or that
they are fleeing as a result of insurance premiums is pure fiction!
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Stricter tort laws will not result in lower malpractice premiums.
The fact that “tort reforms” do not work has been demonstrated in
states like California and admitted to by the insurance industry.
The American Insurance Association (AIA) said that lawmakers who
enact “tort reform” should not expect insurance rates to drop.
Specifically, a March 13, 2002, AIA press release leads with an
astounding pronouncement: “[T]he insurance industry never
promised that tort reform would achieve specific premium savings.”
Donald J. Zuck, Chief Executive of Scpie Holdings,
Inc., a leading malpractice insurer in California, told the Wall
Street Journal: “I don’t like to hear insurance-company
executives say it’s the tort system – it’s self-inflicted.”19]
In the current debate, no insurance spokesperson will agree to
premium reductions if damages caps are instituted. Indeed, they
acknowledge damages caps won’t reduce premiums. American Tort Reform
Association (ATRA) President Sherman Joyce told Liability Week that:
“we wouldn’t tell you or anyone that the reason to pass
tort reform would be to reduce insurance rates.”[20]
And, according to Victor Schwartz, General Counsel of ATRA:“many
tort reform advocates do not contend that restricting litigation
will lower insurance rates, and I’ve never said that in 30 years.”[21]
The Center for Justice & Democracy recently completed an exhaustive
study of the relationship between “tort reform” and malpractice
premiums. They concluded that “tort reform” has historically
had no impact on insurance rates.[22]
Locally, John Henry, CEO of Emory Hospitals, including Emory University
Hospital and Crawford Long Hospital told the Atlanta Business Chronicle
that: “what is happening to us is more than just malpractice insurance.
Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance has gone through the
roof, insurance on buildings has gone up. There does not
seem to be any direct relationship between claims and premium increases;
it seems more related to Sept. 11 and the need for insurance companies
to generate profits for shareholders.”[23]
According to the Wall Street Journal, “[s]ome doctors are beginning
to acknowledge that the conventional focus on jury awards deflects
attention from the insurance industry’s behavior. The American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, for the first time is conceding
that carrier’s business practices have contributed to the current
problem, says Alice Kirkman, a spokesperson for the professional
group:“[W]e are admitting it’s much more of a complex problem
than we have previously talked about,’ she says.”[24]
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Placing additional restrictions on the rights of victims of medical
negligence, which is the solution offered by MAG, the hospitals
and the insurance industry, will not work to lower insurance premiums
– they have failed in the past and will fail again in the future.
A July 2002 study by the National Academy of State Health Policy
(funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation) found that “[t]he
move toward more restrictive tort reform does not address the complexity
of the problem. Previous rounds of tort reform that followed the
malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970s and 1980s have not succeeded
in preventing periodic and dramatic rises in insurance premiums.”[25]
Despite the overwhelming proof to the contrary, insurers and the
medical community claim that capping damages will attract doctors
and keep down malpractice costs. However, according to the American
Medical Association:
States without caps on damages have 4.4% more physicians per capita
than those states that do have caps on damages.26]
Also, the average malpractice premium for doctors
of internal medicine is 2.2% higher in states that cap damages than
in states that do not cap damages[27]
In fact, according to data from the American Medical Association,
California, which has the most restrictive medical malpractice caps
in the country, saw its malpractice premiums b>rise 37% between
1988 and 1998.[28] During the same period, MAG Mutual’s
premium levels went down over 40%.
In 2001, California’s actual average premium per physician of
$27,570 far exceeded Georgia’s average of $19,248.00[29] As of 2002, the average liability premiums
averaged across all specialties are 25% higher in California than
in Georgia.[30] Likewise,
premiums for ob/gyns are 25% higher in California than in Georgia.[31]
Clearly, California is not the model Georgia should follow. Even
the passage of California’s much heralded tort reform law of 1975,
MICRA, did not result in a reduction of malpractice premiums. When
the litigation over the constitutionality of those provisions was
finalized several years later and California’s medical community
still did not begin receiving any relief from escalating liability
insurance premiums, the citizens of that state passed Proposition
103. That public initiative eliminated the insurance industry’s
exemption from antitrust laws, it mandated rollbacks in insurance
rates and it required insurance companies to get pre-approval of
any rate hikes from the state’s insurance department. Only then
did California’s medical community begin to enjoy some stabilization
of its insurance premiums. Thus, if reducing malpractice insurance
premiums is the measuring stick to judge the efficacy of tort reform,
California’s MICRA has been a complete and utter failure.
Critically, no state has ever experienced a reduction in medical
malpractice insurance rates as a result of the passage of tort reform!
As of 2001, 4 of the 5 states that had the most expensive medical
malpractice insurance premiums also had the same “tort reform” provisions
the medical and insurance industries want to pass in Georgia.[32]
Half of the 25 most expensive states for buying medical malpractice
insurance have the same or similar laws and half of the 25 least
expensive states have the same or similar laws.[33]
There simply is no correlation between tort reform and reduced
malpractice premiums.
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Most telling is the fact MAG Mutual’s representatives have consistently
stated that even with the passage of their tort reform proposals,
including severe caps on damages recoverable by a victim of medical
malpractice, they cannot guarantee a premium reduction at any point
in time in the future. Other states that have recently passed draconian
tort reform measures have learned after the fact a very hard lesson
– insurers will never reduce premiums as a result of tort reform
measures. While a handful of states have passed some significant
limitations on the rights of victims of medical malpractice, NONE
of them have seen medical malpractice insurance premiums lowered.
In Mississippi, where a contentious medical malpractice “tort reform”
battle was waged during the summer of 2002, Medical Assurance Co.
of Mississippi notified doctors that it would raise its rates by
45 percent in 2003 “regardless of the special session outcome”
since “tort reform” does “not provide a magical ‘silver-bullet’
that will immediately affect medical malpractice insurance rates.”[34]
; b>In New Jersey, at a meeting of the New Jersey Assembly Joint
Committees of Banking & Insurance and Health & Human Services
on Medical Malpractice, Assemblyman Paul D’Amato asked Patricia
Costanta, chairman and CEO of the MIIX Group of Insurance Companies,
whether the company was promising its doctors that they would
not raise premiums and would in fact reduce them, if the state passed
tort reform. Her response: “No, we’re not telling them that.”[35]
In Nevada, lawmakers were subjected to a nasty campaign by insurers
and organized medicine during the summer of 2002, including the
deliberate closing of trauma centers, in order to strong-arm the
legislature into enacting severe caps on medical malpractice compensation.
Insurance groups fought any attempt to add a provision to guarantee
lower rates should the legislation pass. Within weeks of the law’s
enactment, the insurance industry proclaimed that they would not
reduce insurance rates.[36]
Insurers now say that they are “waiting to see” if caps will
be upheld constitutionally, as many state constitutions prohibit
caps since they directly interfere with the right to a jury trial,
the right to a remedy, equal protection and/or separation of powers.
Such excuses are nothing more than a convenient cover for one
undeniable fact: Insurers have never lowered rates
as a consequence of “tort reform” because such measures are
based on an untrue premise: that the legal system, rather than the
underwriting practices of the insurance industry, is responsible
for gyrations in the cost and availability of insurance. That is
true now and was true during the attempt by insurers to take advantage
of the last hard market cycle in the 1980s.
- Florida – Following enactment of extensive “tort reforms”
in Florida in 1986, Aetna and St. Paul Marine Insurance Company
said they would not reduce rates. In fact, filings by 104 insurers
in Florida showed that out of 277 filings, 175, or 63 percent,
showed no savings from “tort reform” while none showed savings
of more than 10 percent. [37]
- In fact, after Florida passed its 1986 reforms, St. Paul
conducted a study on all of its 1983 and 1984 claims to determine
what effect the passed tort reform measures [including a cap
on non-economic damages, elimination of joint and several liability,
a change in the collateral rule and mandatory structured settlements
on losses above $250,000] would have had on those claims
if the law had already been in effect. Here was St. Paul’s conclusion:
“The tort law changes effective July 1, 1986 in Florida will, hopefully,
have a positive impact on loss costs for occurrences after that
date. However, to forecast the effect is highly speculative.
Our evaluation of prior losses showed little or no savings
under key provisions of the law and our analysis of other provisions
show no expected savings. Our best estimate is no effect from
the tort changes.”[38]
Washington – In 1986, the state of Washington enacted what was
considered at the time “u>one of the most comprehensive [tort] reform
bills yet.” However, after the law passed, Washington State Physicians
Insurance Association, which had testified that the law would
reduce premiums by 25% to 30%, asked for a rate hike.[39]
Connecticut – In 1986, Connecticut enacted major “tort reforms.”
But by 1987, one state lawmaker was noting, “The insurance industry
now says those measures will have no effect on insurance rates.
We have been disappointed by the response of the insurance industry.
The reforms we passed should have led to rate reductions because
we made it more difficult to recover, or set limits on recovery.
But this hasn’t happened.”a href="#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40" >[40]
Why have insurers routinely asked for premium hikes after they
have been successful getting “tort reforms” passed, and why has
there not been a backlash by legislators, medical lobbies and other
policy holders?
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NO and NO. Another red herring thrown out by the insurance industry
and particularly MAG and MAG Mutual is a supposed $1.54 nationwide
combined loss ratio. They state as a matter of fact that the figure
means that insurers are paying out $1.54 for every $1.00 in premium
they take in. That is false and an outright intentional distortion.
A loss ratio is “insurance speak” for losses they predict they will
have to pay in the future. It is reassessed every year. Historically,
it has been extremely inaccurate. Moreover, an insurer’s combined
loss ratio can be well over a dollar in the medical malpractice
industry with the insurer still making a healthy profit, in part
because it does not take into account their ability to turn premium
dollars into long-term investment income. MAG Mutual historically
has grossly overstated its loss ratios but nonetheless it has consistently
made huge amounts of money. The chart below shows how MAG Mutual’s
premiums have exceeded its paid claims (because the typical medical
malpractice claim takes a number of years to close, the amount of
paid claims increases on an annual basis until all claims from any
given year are closed):
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One need only look at the premium
to loss comparison in the chart above to determine how MAG made
a profit every year in the 1990’s and has continued to do so since
2000.
Even if medical malpractice insurance companies spend more than
they make in premiums, they can be, and usually are, still profitable
because they are able to take the premiums they earn, invest them
in the financial markets and hold those premium and investment dollars
for many years before they ever have to pay them out for a claim.
This “float” enables medical malpractice insurance companies to
pay out considerably more money than they earn in premiums and still
do quite well.
MAG Mutual is a model of how a medical malpractice insurer can
succeed in Georgia. MAG Mutual reports in a recent publication
that it is in such good financial shape that:
It paid $30 million in dividends back to its policyholders from
1994-2000[41]
In July 2001, MAG Mutual reported that it had over $558 million
in assets, $176 million in policyholder surplus, and an “A” rating
by A. M. Best[42]
A legitimate question is why MAG has felt obligated to increase
physician premiums instead of using its massive surplus to maintain
level premiums or more moderately increase them.
The truth is malpractice insurance is one of the most profitable
lines of insurance in the industry. The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) reports that medical malpractice
insurers were the third most profitable of all insurers nationwide.[43] Profits from medical malpractice coverage were almost
double the property and casualty insurance industry average in 1999
with malpractice garnering a 14.2% profit, and property and casualty
lines making 8.2%.[44]
In Georgia, malpractice insurers were more profitable than any
other line of insurance except for a few commercial and private
auto lines.[45] When different
auto lines are combined, the NAIC reports that malpractice insurance
was the most profitable definable line of insurance in Georgia
from 1991-2000, the latest dates for which figures have been released.[46]
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This is the third time in the past three decades the insurance
and medical industries have sought to profit from an economic downturn
that in part has caused a temporary increase in insurance premiums.
In the mid-1970’s and most recently in the mid-1980’s, during the
country’s last liability insurance “crisis,” state legislatures
across the country were asked to pass laws restricting the rights
of innocent citizens to be compensated for their injuries.
Major national and Georgia publications appropriately concluded
that the alleged “crisis” in the 1980’s was what it had been in
the 1970’s – part of an insurance cycle which was self-inflicted
by the insurance industry and which was not driven by out of control
claims:
Business Week published an article entitled “The Explosion In
Liability Lawsuits Is Nothing But A Myth.”[47]
A Consumer Reports article entitled “The Manufactured Crisis –
Liability insurance companies have created a crisis and dumped it
on you” noted, “[a] more objective analysis suggests the “crisis”
is of the insurance companies own making.”[48] It quoted a Washington State Task Force
as concluding that the premium escalations were the result “mostly
of poor management practices by the [insurance] companies.”[49]
In Georgia, the business and finance magazine Georgia Trend asked,
b>“Would the insurance crisis go away if Georgia passed tort reform?”
Its response: “Almost certainly the answer is no.”[50]
Similarly, in the late 1980’s, an Attorneys General Report “An
Analysis of The Causes of the Current Crisis of Unavailability and
Unaffordability of Liability Insurance,” pointed the finger back
at the industry, not the civil justice system. The report concluded
that:
The facts do not bear out the allegations of an “explosion in
litigation or in claim size, nor do they bear out the allegations
of a financial disaster suffered by property/casualty insurers today.”
It went on to state, “… the available data indicate the causes of,
and therefore the solutions to, the current crisis lie with the
insurance industry itself.” [51]
“According to a survey taken by the Medical Association of Georgia,
35% of Georgia’s obstetrics practitioners will stop delivering babies
because malpractice insurance premiums have soared. And, almost
80% of all doctors will cut out some services as a defensive measure
against lawsuits.[52]
Interestingly, despite the passage of some tort reform measures
in Georgia in 1987, including repeal of the collateral source rule,
claims exposure did not dramatically decrease. Instead, claims
remained essentially stable or merely increased with inflation,
population growth, advancing medical technology and an increase
in the number of doctors practicing in Georgia. Eventually, a few
years after the mid-1980’s insurance crisis, the insurance cycle
flattened out, rates stabilized and availability improved everywhere.
Despite the ruling of the Georgia Supreme Court striking down the
collateral source statute as unconstitutional in 1991[53] insurers in Georgia and MAG Mutual in particular
went on to make unprecedented profits in the 1990’s – despite a
purported increase in claim amounts. Most critically, not only
did physicians not flee the state, stop delivering babies or cease
reading mammograms, but throughout the 1990’s, malpractice premiums
in Georgia were slashed to unprecedented lows. By 2000, Georgia’s
obstetricians’ rates had plummeted nearly 30% from their 1992 levels.
Today, even amidst the current alleged crisis, OB rates are still
below what insurers charged in Georgia over a decade ago.
Again, where is the crisis?
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The current problems in the medical malpractice insurance market
are a direct result of the cyclical nature of the insurance industry,
the lack of strong non-profit insurance companies, the insurance
price wars of the mid-1990s, the slumping stock market and the downturn
in interest rates. As such, it is an exact repeat of the last two
insurance “crises” of the mid-1980s and mid-1970s. These “crises”
have absolutely nothing to do with the legal system, lawyers or
juries. Rather, they are created by the insurance industry’s
own practices and the insurance underwriting cycle and are affecting
all lines of insurance across the country.
A confluence of events completely unrelated to the court system
is responsible for the present rise of malpractice premiums:
First, b>malpractice insurers slashed premiums throughout the
1990s and used questionable accounting and business practices to
justify their profitability.[54]
Insurers continued slashing premiums even though they “knew rates
were inadequate in 1995 to 2000" to cover claims according
to Bob Sanders, an actuary with Milliman USA, a Seattle consultancy
serving insurance companies.[55]
Now, b>insurance companies must raise their premiums dramatically
to make up for the artificially low premiums charged throughout
the 1990s.
Second, the stock market has tanked. Throughout the 1990s insurers
were able to remain highly profitable because their gains in the
stock market offset their artificially low premiums. According
to theu> Wall Street Journal, “when the bull market stalled in 2000,
investment gains that had patched over inadequate premium rates
disappeared.”[56]
Finally, the national tragedy of September 11, 2001 cost reinsurers
billions of dollars with Lloyd’s of London alone losing approximately
$8 billion[57] Reinsurers
were then required to raise premiums on insurance companies, thus
leading to premium increases across the board.
The result has not been a surprise to insurance observers. According
to the International Risk Management Institute (IRMI):
“What is happening to the market for medical malpractice insurance
in 2001 is a direct result of trends and events present since the
mid to late 1990s. Throughout the 1990s, and reaching a peak around
1997 and 1998, insurers were on a quest for market share, that is,
they were driven more by the amount of premium they could book rather
than the adequacy of premiums to pay losses. In large part this
emphasis on market share was driven by a desire to accumulate large
amounts of capital with which to turn into investment income.”[58]
Added IRMI:“Clearly a business cannot continue operating in that
fashion indefinitely. Indeed, this has been the case for such long
time writers of professional liability insurance as Frontier, Reliance,
and P.I.E. Mutual. These companies, who suffered through several
years of weakening performance, have been liquidated or are otherwise
inactive.”[59]
This has not been lost on the Members of Congress; ten of whom
recently directed the US General Accounting Office to investigate
the role insurers played in the recent spike in medical malpractice
insurance prices.[60] Therefore, any “solution” to the medical
malpractice availability and affordability problem that does not
specifically address the practices of the insurance industry is
doomed to failure.
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Why have St. Paul Co. and smaller companies exited the medical
malpractice insurance market? In 2001, one of the country’s
largest medical malpractice insurance companies, St. Paul, pulled
out of the medical malpractice insurance market, creating significant
supply and demand problems in many states.
According to a June 24, 2002, Wall Street Journal front-page
investigative article, St. Paul, with 20% share of the national
market, pulled out after mismanaging their underwriting and reserves.[61] In the 1980s, the company set aside too much money
for malpractice claims. So, using a tricky accounting method, in
the 1990s the company “released” $1.1 billion in reserves, which
flowed through its income statements and appeared like big profits.
Seeing these profits, many new, smaller carriers came into the market.
Everyone started slashing prices to attract customers. From 1995
to 2000, rates fell so low that they became inadequate to cover
malpractice claims. Many companies collapsed as a result. St. Paul
eventually pulled out, creating huge supply and demand problems
for doctors in many states.[62]
Even after getting out of the medical malpractice business, St.
Paul’s problems continued to demonstrate that poor business practices,
not medical malpractice insurance, have really been at the heart
of the company’s downfall. In May 2002, the company was placed on
credit watch with negative implications and in July 2002, St. Paul
had its ratings lowered again by Standard and Poor’s due to its
handling of asbestos and other environmental claims.
Nevada. In May 2002, the Nevada Attorney General’s office filed
an administrative complaint against St. Paul in connection with
its decision to pull out of the medical malpractice market. The
complaint cites St. Paul for alleged unlawful business practices,
unauthorized policy modifications, payment of commissions to unlicensed
agents, unlawful policy cancellations and nonrenewals and failure
to return unearned premium payments.63]
West Virginia. A group of Charleston surgeons have sued St. Paul
for “grossly poor management” that led St. Paul to drop malpractice
coverage.[64]
Reliance. In June 2002, the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner
filed suit against directors of the defunct Reliance Insurance Co.,
alleging breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. From 1998 through
the first half of 2000, the company’s directors allowed more than
half a billion dollars in dividend and other payments to be paid
to holding companies of which Reliance directors were major shareholders.
Phico. In 2001, Pennsylvania regulators filed a civil fraud
suit against the Pennsylvania Hospital Insurance Co., or Phico,
which filed for bankruptcy in December. The company’s board was
allegedly misled on the adequacy of Phico’s premium rates and funds
set aside to pay claims. “On the way to becoming the nation’s seventh-largest
malpractice insurer, the company had suffered mounting losses on
policies for medical offices and nursing homes as far away as Miami.”[65]
How can insurers continue to blame lawsuits and juries for the
lack of affordable medical malpractice insurance in some states,
when the evidence suggests that mismanagement and fraud are to blame
for so many medical malpractice insurers leaving the market?
These factors have caused the dramatic increases in physician’s
premiums. They have nothing to do with the tort system!
Back to Table of Contents
In the 1990s, insurers in Georgia, including MAG
Mutual, followed the national pattern and kept rates artificially
low, as they tried to undercut other insurers and write as many
policies as possible so that this capital could be turned into investment
income. In Georgia, MAG’s own internal data shows malpractice premiums
actually dropped more than 40% from 1988 to 2000.
As Georgia’s Insurance Commissioner, John Oxendine, recently alluded
to at a seminar when he discussed the malpractice premium increases
in Georgia, the fact is MAG did too good of a job in chasing off
the competition. In addition, St. Paul, the second largest insurer
of doctors in Georgia, withdrew from the national medical malpractice
market. This occurred for reasons completely unrelated to Georgia,
but instead due to gross mismanagement and St. Paul’s ill-fated
acquisition of American Continental/MMI, which unexpectedly increased
its reserve requirements overnight by hundreds of millions of dollars.
Thus, Georgia has been left with too few carriers. MAG’s marketing
techniques, along with questionable business practices by insurers,
forced many companies and other established insurers to either leave
the market or adopt these irresponsible practices. Once insurers'
investment income began to slump, improper claims management and
under priced coverage forced them to raise rates considerably and
to restrict coverage or leave the market. The insurance companies
would not be in this position had they simply priced their product
appropriately and not been so hungry for investment income.[66]
Back to Table of Contents
Malpractice premiums are not driving up healthcare costs.
Medical costs rose 13 times faster than malpractice premiums from
1988-1998[67]

Medical malpractice costs are at an all-time low as a percentage
of national health care expenditures - .55% of total health care
costs.[68]
Based on the small share of the total healthcare budget, even
if all medical malpractice cases were eliminated, the cost “savings”
would only be about one-half of one percent of every dollar spent
on health care.
These facts show that medical malpractice insurance is truly an
amazing value, particularly when one considers that medical negligence
is the 8th leading cause of death in the U.S. and that medical errors
cost the U.S. economy between $17 billion and $29 billion each year.[69]
Additionally, “defensive medicine” is not a key factor in driving
up health care costs. In 1994, the Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) was asked initially by proponents of sweeping malpractice
tort restrictions to study the issue. OTA found, among other things,
that only “a relatively small proportion of all diagnostic procedures
– certainly less than 8 percent – are likely to be caused primarily
by conscious concern about malpractice liability risk.” OTA found
that most physicians who order “aggressive diagnostic procedures
... do so primarily because they believe such procedures are medically
indicated, not primarily because of concerns about liability.”
The effects of traditional tort reforms – particularly caps on damages
and amendments to the collateral source rule – on defensive medicine
“are likely to be small.”[70]
Back to Table of Contents
Georgia law already has some of the strongest legal
protections just for doctors and hospitals.
In Georgia, a victim of malpractice must have another doctor swear
under oath that the physician or hospital committed malpractice
before he or she can file a lawsuit for medical malpractice.[71]
In a medical malpractice trial, the jury is told from the beginning
of their deliberations to presume that the doctor provided appropriate
care.[72]
If the jury makes a questionable decision in favor of a victim
of malpractice, the judge can reduce the verdict or even order a
new trial for the doctor or the hospital.[73]
Even if the jury returns what the defense perceives is a “runaway
verdict” for an injured patient, the insurance company for the doctor
or hospital virtually always settles the case for an amount that
is already covered by the doctor’s or hospital’s insurance policy
limits.
In reality, jurors are extremely sympathetic to physicians and
unlikely to award damages to an injured person:
In cases MAG has taken to trial since 1982, the defendant healthcare
provider has won in 82% of the cases – even though the jury hears
expert physician testimony establishing that the doctor committed
negligence that caused the plaintiff’s injuries.[74]
In 2001, MAG Mutual made NO indemnity payment in 83% of the claims
it closed.
In 2001, MAG won 81 percent of the cases it took to trial.[75]
Why should doctors and hospitals be held any less accountable for
the harm they cause than the rest of us?
Additional tort restrictions on the legal rights of patients would
only punish those Georgians who have been injured by medical errors
and need help to recover and would not provide physicians or hospitals
relief from rising premiums.
Back to Table of Contents
At the same time doctors and hospitals are being squeezed by their
malpractice insurers, they are also facing reduced reimbursement
rates from Medicaid, Medicare and HMOs. Any effective solutions
to the medical malpractice insurance affordability and availability
problem must address these factors. The Legislature should:
Explore the creation and promotion of new doctor and hospital owned
insurance vehicles – physician and hospital group mutuals, trusts,
captives and risk retention groups. In March of 2002, Joe Parker,
President of the Georgia Hospital Association was quoted in the
Atlanta Business Chronicle as saying that within the next few weeks
the GHA would roll out a medical malpractice captive product which
in the long run would save hospitals money and would allow them
to recoup any money not spent. To date, GTLA is unaware of any
such concept actually being implemented or created. Such insurance
options would give physicians and hospitals more control over premiums,
risk management and litigation decision-making. Insurance industry
experts have said that these can be created with relative ease and
without as much capital as one might expect. Notwithstanding MAG
Mutual’s conduct of late, experience shows that doctor owned companies
can withstand the predatory practices of the insurance industry
and the drastic cycles of the insurance market.
Create a market assistance plan whereby the state would act as
a broker to place those physicians and hospitals that cannot find
coverage.
Require stricter and more detailed filing requirements by malpractice
insurers to gauge when they are under pricing and to forecast the
need for moderate increases in premiums before an economic
downturn.
Implement tax incentives and breaks for insurance carriers to
attract more carriers to be domiciled in this state. Georgia’s
premium tax is the third highest in the nation. It has caused at
least eight insurance companies to move their domicile to states
other than Georgia.
Consider raising Medicaid, Medicare and HMO reimbursement rates,
especially for rural healthcare providers and for ‘high risk’ specialties.
Require closer oversight by the Department of Insurance in connection
with the raising or lowering of premiums.
Vest the Insurance Commissioner with authority to place limitations
on how premiums can be set with the manipulation of credits and
debits.
Give real teeth to “prompt pay” laws.
Reduce the incidence of malpractice by all means possible including
passing legislation increasing nurse to patient ratios, making mandatory
the reporting of medical errors and narrowing or eliminating peer
review.
Focus on civil justice changes that result in the more efficient
and timely resolution of malpractice cases and the reduction of
frivolous claims and defenses.
Eliminate the insurance industry’s exemption from antitrust laws
so as to preclude them from engaging in anti-competitive conduct
that fixes prices and prevents physicians and hospitals from having
any equality in bargaining power.
Back to Table of Contents
The Real Crisis – Medical Negligence
As stated above, the cost of medical malpractice premiums are essentially
one half of one percent of the total cost of health care. We should
be focusing instead on the cost of medical negligence on our citizens
and our health care system.
Medical errors kill as many as 98,000 Americans every year
and seriously injure another 1,000,000 per year. This makes
medical errors the 8th leading cause of death in the U.S., higher
than AIDS, automobile accidents and breast cancer.[76]
Extrapolated to Georgia’s population, that same study shows that
nearly 2,800 Georgians die annually as a result of medical errors.
This correlates to more than 7 Georgians dying from malpractice
every single day. And another 77 Georgians are seriously injured
by medical mistakes every day.
75,000 hospital patients were killed in 2000 by preventable infections,
making it the fourth leading cause of death for Americans. “Infection
rates are soaring nationally, exacerbated by hospital cutbacks and
carelessness by doctors and nurses.”[77]
Hospital patients are 36% more likely to get an infection now
than they were in the 1970s. [78]
Medical errors cost the economy $29 billion every year in excess
medical expenses and lost productivity.[79]
One out of every 200 people admitted to a hospital dies because
of a hospital mistake.[80]
Only one out of every eight patients who are killed or seriously
injured by medical negligence ever files a lawsuit.[81]
Physicians have operated on the wrong body part or the wrong patient
at least 108 times over the last two years. These mistakes “are
completely preventable and should never happen.”[82]
A recent study by the Harvard School of Public Health reported
that more than one third of practicing physicians and 40% of the
public have experienced a medical error – defined as a mistake that
results in death, disability or requiring additional treatment.
18% of physicians and 24% of the public said the mistake caused
“serious health consequences.”[83]
In light of these sad and sobering facts, now is not the time to
make life more difficult for those who have become victims of medical
malpractice. It is vitally important to the safety of all Georgia
families that those people who have been injured by a medical error
should be able to receive compensation for their injuries and assistance
in their recovery. It is equally important that health care consumers
are able to access the track records of physicians and hospitals
so they can make informed decisions when choosing a health care
provider. Consumer information is an area that needs significant
improvement.
Back to Table of Contents
Placing arbitrary limits on the 7th Amendment rights of our citizens,
especially those who have placed their trust and often their lives
in the hands of a medical care provider, only to be harmed by that
provider, will have real life, devastating effects on real life
people. A cap on “non-economic” damages would cruelly impact those
devastated by acts of malpractice while failing to achieve any correction
of the premium problem. Before considering drastic and unnecessary
changes to the civil justice system, consider the following real
examples of actual claims involving Georgia citizens and the impact
of an arbitrary cap on damages:
The survivors of a 26-year-old, low-wage-earning mother, whose
death was caused by a botched cesarean section, who would have almost
no economic damages to recover. Her husband was left with no spouse
and the baby girl has no mother. Tort “reformers” would limit this
family’s rights to recovering $250,000.
The case of the death of a 21-year-old college student, whose
bacterial meningitis was misdiagnosed, would involve very little
economic damages. His parents were left to agonize over the unfulfilled
dreams of a life they had created but the tort reformers would value
their loss at nothing more than $250,000.
The tort reformers also would limit to $250,000 the value of the
loss of an elderly woman, whose life expectancy was “only another
10 years” according to an insurance company’s actuarial experts.
She was subjected to the excruciatingly painful effects of a decubitus
ulcer that was allowed to develop, exposing the woman’s tailbone
and hipbone to life-threatening bacteria from the feces she was
forced to lay in for days at the nursing home before she ultimately
died of neglect and starvation.
This is the third time in the last three decades that the insurance
industry has created this medical malpractice insurance “crisis.”
Each time the powerful insurance companies demand that lawmakers
enact tort “reform” as the only solution to fix the problem. But,
as we have seen, tort “reform” is not the answer, it only increases
insurance company profits and punishes those who have been wrongfully
injured. It is time for everyone to recognize that this problem
is not only happening in all lines of insurance, but is also occurring
throughout the world and the same old “fix” of blaming lawsuits
is not the real answer. Now is the time for us to begin looking
for new solutions and to start looking into the true root of the
problem – insurance industry practices by both the liability and
health insurance sectors. Only through insurance reform can the
next insurance rate hike cycle be avoided.
[1] Insurance Information Institute, “2002/2003 Outlook
for Auto and Homeowners Insurance Rates.”
[2] Id
[3] Id.
[4] “Malpractice Policy Rates on the Rise,” The National
Law Journal, June 4, 2002.
[5] Another Brick In The Wall: An Empirical Look
At Tort Litigation In The 1990s, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1049 (2000).
[6] “Relation between
malpractice claims and adverse events due to negligence. Results
of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III,” New England Journal of
Medicine, Vol. 325:245-251, July 25, 1991, cited by Dept.
of Health and Human Services, “Confronting the New Health Care Crisis,”
p. 8, July 24, 2002.
[7] Another Brick In The Wall: An Empirical Look
At Tort Litigation In The 1990s, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1049 (2000).
[8] Id
[9] Id
[10] Insurers’ Missteps
Helped Provoke Malpractice Crisis, The Wall Street Journal, June
24, 2002.
[11] 2002 Georgia Verdict Survey, Jury Verdict Research.
[12] Public use data file from the National Practioner
Data Bank, April 2002.
[13] Adjusted using the Abstract of the United States
2001, The National Data Book, 121st Edition, U.S. Census Bureau.
[14] Public use data file from the National Practitioners
Data Bank, April 2002.
[15] The MAGnet, January 2002.
[16] Eleanore D.
Kinney, “Malpractice Reform in the 1990’s: Past Disappointment, Future
Success?” 20 J. Health Pol’y & L. 99, 120 (1995), cited in Marc
Galanter, “Real World Torts,” 55 Md. L. Rev. 1093, 1152 (1996).
[17] Source: various editions of The American Medical
Association’s Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the U.S.
[18] “The Tort Mess”, Forbes, May 13, 2002.
[19] Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2002.
[20] Liability Week, July 19, 1999.
[21] Business Insurance, July 19, 1999.
[22] Premium Deceit – The Failure of ‘tort reform’
to Cut Insurance Prices, J. Robert Hunter, former Commissioner
of Insurance in Texas and Joanne Doroshow, Executive Director of Center
for Justice & Democracy.
[23] Atlanta Business Chronicle, March 28, 2002,
p. 36A.
[24] Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2002.
[25] The Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Opportunity for State Action, National
Academy of State Health Policy (July 2002)
[26] American Medical
Association Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the US,
2001 Edition. A state is classified as having a “cap” when there exists
a general noneconomic damage cap that affects medical malpractice
or a broad medical malpractice specific cap on noneconomic damages.
Caps that affect one area of medical malpractice (e.g. just wrongful
death cases) or punitive damage caps are not counted since these represent
a small number of cases. Cap states include: AK, CA, CO, FL, HI, ID,
IN, KS, LA, MD, MA, MI, MO, MT, NE, NM, ND, SD, UT, VA, WV and WI.
[27] Derived from
data provided by Medical Liability Monitor (Vol. 26, #10 – Oct 2001)
A state’s average premium is calculated as the unweighted mean value
of premiums for all companies for which data is provided across all
regions. A state is classified as having a “cap” when there exists
a general noneconomic damage cap that affects medical malpractice
or a broad medical malpractice specific cap on noneconomic damages.
Caps that affect one area of medical malpractice (e.g. just wrongful
death cases) or punitive damage caps are not counted since these represent
such a small number of cases.
[28] American Medical
Association, Socioeconomic Characteristics of Medical Practice, 2000-2002.
The countrywide average excluding California during that same period
rose only 5.7%.
[29] Derived from
data provided by Medical Liability Monitor, 2001.
[30] Derived from data provided by Medical Liability
Monitor, October 2002.
[31] Id
[32] Derived from data provided by Medical Liability
Monitor, 2001.
[33] Id.
[34] “Doc-owned insurance raising rates 45%”, The
Sun Herald, September 23, 2002.
[35] June 3, 2002,
meeting of the New Jersey Assembly Joint Committees of Banking &
Insurance and Health & Human Services on Medical Malpractice
[36] “Insurer has no plans to lower costs in Las
Vegas,” Associated Press, August 10,2002.
[37] “Tort Reform’s
a Fraud, Insurers Admit,” and “Tort Reform Will Not Reduce Insurance
Rates, Say 100+ Florida Insurers,” National Insurance Consumer Organization
(1986).
[38] St. Paul Rate
Filing, State of Florida Department of Insurance, 1986
[39] “State hires outside firm to look at liability
rate request,” UPI, December 4, 1986. See also, “Tort reform legislation:
Did state get ‘suckered,’” Seattle Times July 1, 1986.
[40] “Insurers Warn,” UPI, March 9, 1987.
[41] The MAGnet, April 2001.
[42] The MAGnet, July 2001.
[43] National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
Profitability by Line by State in 2000, (Published 2001).
[44] National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
Profitability by Line By State in 1999, (Published 2001).
[45] National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
Profitability by Line by State in 2000, (Published 2001).
[46] Id
[47] “The Explosion In Liability Lawsuits Is Nothing
But A Myth,” Business Week, April 1986 at pp. 24-25.
[48] Consumer Reports, August 1986, at pp. 544-549.
[49] Id
[50] Georgia Trend, Magazine of Georgia Business
and Finance, July 19, 1986, pp. 56-57.
[51] Francis K.
Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, et al., Analysis of the
Causes of the Current Crisis of Unavailability and Unaffordability
of Liability Insurance, prepared for the National Association of Attorneys
General, May, 1986, p. 45.
[52] Atlanta Journal & Constitution, November
29, 1985.
[53] Denton v.
Con-way Southern Express, Inc., et al., 261 Ga. 41, 402 S.E.2d
269 (1991).
[54] Wall Street
Journal, June 24, 2002.
[55] Id
[56] Id
[57] “Lloyd’s Plans To Alter How It Finances Insurance,”
New York Times, July 19, 2002 (Joseph B. Treaster).
[58] Klodkin, Charles, “Medical Malpractice Insurance
Trends? Chaos!” International Risk Management Institute.
[59] Id
[60] “Lawmakers Seek GAO Explanation Of Insurers’
Rates,” The Wall Street Journal, 7/3/2002.
[61] Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2002.
[62] Id
[63] “Complaint
Filed Against St. Paul Insurance Companies For Unlawful Business Practices,”
Press Release, State of Nevada, Office of the Attorney General, May
30, 2002.
[64] Eric P. Mantz,
M.D., et al. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, et al.,
Case No. 02-C-770, In the Circuit Court, Kanawha County, West Virginia.
[65] Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2002.
[66] Joseph
Treaster, Malpractice Rates Are Rising Sharply; Health Costs Follow,
New York Times, September 10, 2001.
[67] Malpractice
data from the American Medical Association, Socioeconomic Characteristics
of Medical Practice. Medical care costs calculated from the Consumer
Price Index Home Page: http://stats.bls.gov/cpihome.htm.
[68] Personal Health
Care Expenditures taken from the Health Care Financing Administration
[http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/nheoact/stateestimates/Tables98]. "Total
spent on medical malpractice insurance,” reflects US total medical
malpractice premiums written according to AM Best State Line Report
(the insurance industry's leading provider of information and company
ratings).
[69] ute of Medicine,
National Academy Press: Washington, DC, 1999.
[70] U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice, OTA -H- 602 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Gov’t. Printing Office, July 1994).
[71] See, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1.
[72] See, Shea v. Phillips, 213 Ga. 269, 271,
98 S.E.2d 552 (1957).
[73] See, O.C.G.A. § 5-5-50; § 51-12-12.
[74] The MAGnet, January, 2002.
[75] Id
[76] Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human: Building
a Safer Health System, November 1999.
[77] Infection epidemic carves deadly path, Chicago
Tribune, July 21, 2002.
[78] Investor’s Business Daily, Hospitals’
Dirty Little Secret: Infections Now Are Rampant. August 2, 2002.
[79] Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human: Building
a Safer Health System, November 1999.
[80] Harvard Medical
Practice Study, Patients, Doctors and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation,
and Patient Compensation in New York (1990).
[81] Id
[82] Surgical Calamities
on Rise, Group Says, Washington Post, December 6, 2001, A14
[83] Harvard School
of Public Health / Kaiser Family Foundation “Medical Errors: Practicing
Physicians and Public Views,“ New England Journal of Medicine, December
2002.
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