THE VERDICT
A publication of GAPTA, Inc.
(Georgia Association of Plaintiffs' Trial Attorneys)
Vol. I No.3

PRESIDENT'S COLUMN

Having just returned from the NACCA National Convention in Miami, I am refreshed, educated and reeducated, and eager to put into effect the new ideas that I was able to pick up while attending the daily sessions at the Conven­tion. It was truly a great legal seminar, with the stars of the legal profession and judiciary present. Justice Tom Clark, of the United States Supreme Court, made a great speech at the banquet in which he praised our Plaintiffs' Bar Association, deplored the congestion in the courts, begged us to do everything within our power to keep the present jury system of passing upon the rights of our citizens. The last morning's program was something that excelled anything that I have ever seen even in the movies, in the courtrooms, or at seminars. It was the examination of doctors, both plaintiffs' and defendants' doc­tors, by both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys, with a real judge presiding. It was a most effective demonstration of the presentation of medical testi­mony of a case.

The transcript of this Conven­tion may be ordered by anyone desiring it from the W. H. Anderson Company, 646 Main Street, Cincin­nati, Ohio.­

DAMAGES IN A DEATH CASE OR A CASE INWHICH 'I'HERE IS­ PERMANENT DISABILITY ­

Under our law, the damages in a death case do not present a difficult problem where the decedent was earning a salary of some type. Assume that the decedent was 40 years of age at the time of his death and, according to our latest mortality tables, had the life expectancy of approximately 30 years. Assume the decedent was earning $300.00 per month. The value of his life would be 30 years times $3,600.00, or $108,000.00, reduced by 7% to obtain present cash value.

For a client who is permanently disabled, the damages are calculated by the same method, i.e., his salary times his life expectancy, reduced by 7% for present cash value.

There is a problem present when the decedent was not a wage earner and was a housewife or a young girl who was not employed. To place the value of the life of such a person, it is neces­sary to go into the intangible factors which our courts will permit. Melvin M. Belli had this same problem in the Maureen Connolly case, where he repre­sented a champion amateur tennis player who was young and who had never earned any wages. Mr. Belli, by the use of Jack Kramer and other tennis professionals, projected the earnings which "Little Mo" would have made had she turned pro for the period of time when she would be at her best as a profes­sional tennis player. He was able by this method to obtain a verdict for $95,000.00 based upon a suit for $215,000.00, a portion of which was punitive damages. A case such as this requires some research on other cases to find an effective way of proving to the jury the value of the life of the decedent.

In a permanent injury case, most likely there will be pain for the remainder of the life expect­ancy of your client. In that event, you will want to figure, in addition to your loss of wages, a sum of money for the pain and suf­fering for the remainder of the life expectancy. This can be done through the use of the elements of time, for example, $.05 per hour for the remainder of the 30 years of life expectancy broken down into hours. This would be 365 days times 24 hours, which would give you the total hours per year, times the number of years of life expectancy. In the case of a life expectancy of 30 years, this would be 8,760 hours times 30, which would give you 262,800 hours, and, if the pain was mild, at $.0 5 per hour this would give you $13,140.00 for future pain and suffering.

Please continue to make an effort to obtain new members for our organization, but in so doing please be selective so that we can have members of whom we are all proud.

Yours for a greater GAPTA,

CULLEN M. WARD, President

STAFF

Editor. . . . . . William W. Daniel

Associate Editor. . Ross Arnold

GAPTA BRIEF BANK OF GEORGIA LAW

All members of GAPTA will be interested to know that we have set up a ­Brief Bank of Georgia Law pertaining to tort cases. Coordinating this Brief Bank program is Ross Arnold, Associate Editor of The Verdict. All members of GAPTA are requested to send to Ross any worth-while brief on

Georgia tort law together with any comments they may wish to make so that these briefs may be indexed and filed for future reference by all GAPTA Mem­bers. Your Executive Committee is presently working out rules pertaining to the use of such briefs, but it is expected that the obtaining of copies of such briefs will be free except for photocopy and reproduction costs. How­ever, when a member requests a copy of a brief, he will be expected to send to the Bank one of his own briefs for indexing and future use by other members. In this way, we will build up a Georgia Brief Bank in the least possible time.

From time to time The Verdict will carry a list of briefs available in Bank, and will also, of course, from time to time, carry a list of new briefs received by the Bank.

It should take no emphasis to the members for it to be very clear how tremendously helpful such a Brief Bank will be to our membership. We hope and expect that the "Bank" will save our membership a great deal of research time and at the same time improve the quality of service they are able to give their injured clients.

Briefs for the Bank should be sent for indexing and filing to Ross Arnold, c/o Arnold & Harris, 904 Grant Building, Atlanta 3, Georgia.

RECENT GEORGIA CASES OF INTEREST

NONRESIDENT MOTORIST ACT MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED - ACTION AGAINST RESIDENT DEFENDANT WHO HAS BEEN SERVED CAN'T BE DISMISSED IF HE MOVES OUT OF GA. AND AN ACTION FILED IN ANOTHER COUNTY. Tomlinson v. Sadler, 99 Ga. App. 482 (1959). Action aris­ing out of auto collision brought against resident of Ga. After defendant was served, he moved to another state. Original action was dismissed and a new action was filed in another county (county in which collision occurred). Held, for defendant. Nonresident Motorist Act defines a "nonresident" to include a defendant who "shall cease to be a resident of this State at any time prior to the service of any summons or other process." But this Act is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. Hence, the Act will not apply to the present case. "This defendant did not ­become a nonresident prior to the service of a summons or other pro­cess."

PRAYER FOR PROCESS WHICH REQUIRES DEFENDANT TO ANSWER AT NEXT TERM SUBJECT TO A MOTION TO QUASH. McCoy v. Horny Hammes Corp., 99 Ga. App. 513 (1959), and McCoy v. Owens, Inc., 99 Ga. App. 615 (1959). It makes no difference whether the clerk attaches a process directing the defendant to appear and answer the petition within 30 days or whether the process requires the defendant to appear at the next term. Where this occurs, the proper procedure is for the plaintiff to amend his prayer. If this is not done and the defendant has not waived process, the court obtains no jurisdiction of the defendant.

MOTION TO VACATE; EX PARTE ORDER OF SET'I'LEMENT GRANTED WHERE ATTORNEY FOR COLLISION INSURANCE CARRIER FILED SUIT WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF PLAINTIFF. Lowance v. Dempsey, 99 Ga. App. 592 (1959). An action was filed in the Civil Court of Fulton County seek­ing to recover $815 property damage to an auto. The defendant paid the amount of the suit plus cost into court. The Judge entered an order reciting that the "suit having been paid off in full. . . the action is dismissed of record as settled." Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate, alleging that he had suffered personal injury and property damage and was filing an action in the Fulton Superior Court to recover. "Where the motion to vacate and evidence on the trial thereof show without dispute that the attorneys filing the action in the name of the plaintiff were not acting on his behalf, but on behalf of the insurance company which they represent­ed, and that the plaintiff did not authorize the particular action which was filed in the Civil Court of Fulton County (although he had agreed with the insurance company to file an appro­priate action, which he subsequently did in the Superior Court of Fulton County, the only-court having Jurisdiction of all the relief prayed for), the plaintiff was not bound by a pur­ported ex parte order of settlement and dismissal in the Civil Court of Fulton County of which he had no knowledge, so as to preclude him from prosecuting his action in the Superior Court. Accordingly, the Judge of the Civil Court of Fulton County correctly held that his judgment vacating and setting aside the judgment of settlement and dismissal in that court was demand­ed as a matter of law.

PLAINTIFF VISITING SUBTENANT MAY BE FOUND BY JURY TO BE AN INVITEE OF OWNER OF BUILDING WHERE OWNER KNEW OF SUBTENANT'S OCCUPANCY FOR A PERIOD OF YEARS AND PERMITTED SUBTENAN T TO ERECT SIGNS ON BUILDING AND ON OFFICE DOOR. Knudsen v. Duffee-Freeman, Inc., 99 Ga. App. 520 (1959). "It is en­tirely immaterial whether Keel (the person the plaintiff was planning to visit) was a tenant of the defendant or a subtenant of a tenant if under the other facts shown the defendant impliedly invited persons having busi­ness with Keel to come upon its prem­ises for that purpose."

FOREIGN CASES OF INTEREST FROM RECENT NACCA NEWS LETTERS­

2d Circuit

EVIDENCE - AUTO ACCIDENTS - QUALIFIED POLICE OFFICER, PUT ON BY PLAINTIFF, WHO HAD EXAMINED SKID MARKS & OTHER TELLTALE EVIDENCE AT SCENE OF ACCI­DENT 1 1/4 HRS AFTER IT HAPPENED, HELD COMPETENT TO GIVE HIS ESTIMATE OF DEFENDANT'S SPEED AT TIME OF IM­PACT - ALSO QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY AS TO WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN REASONABLY SAFE SPEED UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES ­DOCTOR'S REPORTS, ADMISSIBILITY OF ­REPORT OF DOCTOR WHO EXAMINED PLAINTIFF AT REQUEST OF DEFENDANT'S INSURER HELD ADMISSIBLE UNDER FEDERAL BUSINESS ENTRY SATUTE - EVEN THOU IT REFERED TO X-RAYS OF PLAINTIFF TAKEN BY ANOTHER DR., NOT INTRODUCED WITH REPORT. White v. Zutell, 263 F. 2d 613 (2d Cir. 1959).

North Carolina

OCCUPIERS' LIABILITY - OF RESTAURANT TO INVITEE - FELL TO FLOOR WHEN SNAG ON MAGAZINE RACK CAUGHT IN PLAIN­TIFF'S TROUSER LEG - DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE FOR JURY - ERROR TO NON­SUIT PLAINTIFF. Sledge v. Wagoner, 104 S.B. 2d 195 (N.C. 1958).

A RECENT VERDICT OF NOTE

Willard Norris v. Atlantic Co., Fulton Superior Court. Action by husband for loss of services resulting from whiplash injury to wife. $8,500 verdict awarded (including medical expenses of approximately $400 and about $100 for damage to car). Wife confined to hospital for 9 days. Trial about 22 months after injury. Defendant's testimony was that plaintiff's wife was well; plaintiff's testimony was that she still had periodic pain after hard work or overexertion. All findings were subjective. Motion for a new trial, on ground of which was exces­siveness of verdict, was overruled, and judgment was paid.

EDITOR'S NOTE : Please send informa­tion on all cases in which large ver­dicts are obtained as well as those involving unusual points of law to William W. Daniel, 925 Grant Bldg., Atlanta, Georgia. We feel that this information will be beneficial to GAPTA members.

A NOTE OF GRATITUDE

GAPTA is indebted to Label List Asso­ciates, 903 Ga. Savings Bank Bldg., 80 Peachtree St., Atlanta, Ga., for hand­ling free of cost the distribution of The Verdict. Label List Associates specializes in preparing mailing address tapes for quantity mailing.